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Im Fokus
ASEAN: Cooperative disaster relief after the
tsunami*
Heide Haruyo Gentner**
1 Introduction
On 26 December 2004, a tsunami caused by an earth-
quake in the Indian Ocean struck the coasts of four
ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations)
member countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Myanmar and
Malaysia. Altogether, the tsunami killed more than
200.000 people in these four countries as well as in
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka, and devastated their
coastal regions (SOAa, 1/2005, p. 5).
In this article, I would like to examine how ASEAN
responded to the tsunami disaster and deﬁne to what
extent the member countries cooperated. The main
question is, whether or not there was eﬀective multi-
lateral disaster relief activity among ASEAN member
countries. If there was such cooperation, how was it
organised? If there was no eﬀective cooperation, what
were the reasons? Hence the question arises, whether or
not ASEAN is able to manage disaster relief by its own
eﬀorts.
Not only natural disasters, but other problems such as
terrorism are issues in the East Asian region. We must
therefore examine how ASEAN, founded in 1967, is able
to manage disasters and how the organization does co-
operate in cases of disaster. To improve disaster relief
in the future, it is indispensable to analyse the attitudes
of the ASEAN members countries.
The main premise of the paper is, that there was no
cooperative disaster relief at ASEAN level, because the
countries are unwilling to make any compromises con-
cerning their sovereignty. To answer the main question,
the problems of interacting within the organization will
be pointed out in Section 2.2 following. For a better un-
derstanding of the diﬃculties, the natural sources and
the political situation will be studied in detail in Section
2.1. In Section 2.3 the ASEAN declaration on disaster
relief will be presented. Section 3 points out to what
extent ASEAN members were aﬀected and how they re-
sponded to the tsunami disaster. The reaction of non-
ASEAN countries and the assistance given for disaster
relief will be discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the
main topic of this paper will be examined, followed by
an analysis of the problems of organizing disaster relief.
2 The Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN)
2.1 The ASEAN member countries –
political and economical background
The regional diﬀerences between the South East Asian
countries are very great. Most nations have been ruled
for centuries by royal dynasties, which did not inter-
change with one another (Frost 1990: 2). Thus, each
country developed a distinctive culture within its own
region, resulting in various religious, political and eco-
nomical systems. Also, the language and religion of each
country became very distinctive, setting the stage for
diﬀerent political developments. This explains why var-
ious ASEAN countries are today governed by democ-
racies, communist regimes, military autocracies or even
monarchies.
Brunei is known for its rich oil reserves. It has a rel-
atively high average income per inhabitant (2004: US$
14,412) (AA 2005b). Since independence from Great
Britain, the country has been ruled by a Sultan, gov-
erning absolutistically. Wealth is distributed unevenly,
resulting in a small but very rich upper class and a broad
lower class. Thus, Brunei still has the characteristics of
a Third World country. One of its oﬃcial foreign policy
guidelines is the maintenance of sovereignty and inde-
pendence (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs 2005).
Cambodia is a constitutional monarchy. After gain-
ing independence from France in 1954, a parliamentary
democracy was constituted (Samnang 1998: 108-110).
Starting in 1970, the Communist “Khmer Rouge“ en-
gaged in a civil war, bringing their leader Pol Pot to
power in 1975. During his terror regime, which lasted
only until 1979, approximately 1.5 million people died.
In Cambodia, there are no serious problems due to eth-
nic demands. However, the people’s support of the rul-
ing monarchy is not very ﬁrm, causing legitimacy prob-
lems for the current political system (Narine 2004: 435).
Indonesia has a population of approximately 220 mil-
lion people and is the world’s most populous Muslim
country. In the province of Aceh there are separatist
rebels who have been ﬁghting the Indonesian govern-
ment since the 1970s. The conﬂict has attained the level
of a civil war. Due to great ethnic diversity, Indonesia
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has had to struggle with regional instability, weaken-
ing the power of the state. Apart from the problems
of separatism, Indonesia also faces the threat of Islamic
terrorism and economic problems (FAZ, 30.12.04).
Laos is ruled by a one-party government, the Revo-
lutionary People‘s Party (LRVP), since 1975. Although
economic growth rates are fairly high, per capita income
is very low (US$ 438) (AA 2005c). The government fol-
lows a foreign policy of isolation (Rüland 1998: 274).
Malaysia has been exposed to various foreign inﬂu-
ences during the last centuries, leading to ethnic diver-
sity within the population. Following British colonial
occupation, the country has managed to become one of
the most stable in the region. Also, ethnic coalition poli-
cies have led to strong political stability. The majority
of the Malay ethnic group supports the ruling party, so
that disadvantaged minorities may accept the state in
a rather half-hearted way (Narine 2004: 432-434). The
per capita GDP amounts to US$ 9,700 (CIA 2005a).
Myanmar has been ruled by a military regime for the
last 43 years. Following an uprising in 1988 the govern-
ment suspended the constitution, which has not been
reinstated. Although there are no dependable economic
data on Myanmar available, it is considered one of the
poorest countries in the region, with an estimated per
capita GDP of US$ 1,700 (Gateway 2005).
The Philippines were a Spanish colony for many cen-
turies. After the American-Spanish war of 1898, the
Philippines came under the inﬂuence of the U.S. which
held military bases on the Philippines into the 1990s.
The island state is a democracy. It is one of the poorer
countries in South East Asia, with a per capita GDP
of US$ 1,051 (AA 2005a). Today, the government is
plagued by regional conﬂicts and separatist movements
(Narine 2004: 434).
Singapore is the wealthiest ASEAN country and a
good example of how citizens tend to be more support-
ive of the government when there is economic prosperity.
Yet, the state does not allow for a strong opposition and
uses intimidation against members of non-government
parties. Nevertheless, the 4.4 million inhabitants live in
a prosperous country boasting a per capita GDP of US$
27,800 and economic growth rates of up to 8.1 percent
(CIA 2005b).
Thailand is the only country that has not been colo-
nized. After a period of military coups during the twen-
tieth century, the monarchy was able to stabilise the
country in the 1990s and establish democracy. How-
ever, the government is still struggling to ﬁnd a more
democratic relationship towards society (Narine 2004:
435). Meanwhile Thailand has gained economic stabil-
ity, boasting a per capita GNI of US$ 2,190 (World Bank
2005b).
Vietnam underwent many years of civil war, escalating
to a war with the USA. In 1975, the last US troops left
the country. Today, Vietnam is ruled by a communist
one-party system, similar to Laos. Nevertheless, Viet-
nam’s economy is growing at a fast rate. This is partly
due to the government allowing foreign investment dol-
lars entering the country. Foreign direct investment in
2003 was 8% of the total GDP, US$ 1,450.00 million
(World Bank 2005a).
2.2 Cooperation within ASEAN
With the founding of ASEAN in 1967 there was no in-
tention to build an “Asian Union“ (taz, 18.7.95). The
member countries were not willing to give up sovereignty
rights. The new institution was supposed to demon-
strate closeness externally and supply a platform for di-
alogue, but without any interference in the internal af-
fairs of ASEAN member countries. On 8 August 1967,
the ﬁve founding members signed a paper in Bangkok,
called the “Bangkok Declaration“ (ASEAN 2005b). This
has only a declarative character, without any obligations
according to international law. Beside the acknowledg-
ment of national sovereignty, they wished to promote
eﬀective cooperation, leading to regional solidarity.
The ASEAN member countries, in particular the ﬁve
original members – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Sin-
gapore, and the Philippines – have been practising a
series of unique diplomatic norms, which comprise poli-
cies of non-interference in the internal aﬀairs of other
members – the so-called “ASEAN way“. This form of
dialogue is a determining precondition for ASEAN’s
multilateral diplomacy. Hence, it was possible for the
ASEAN countries to practice dialogue without criticiz-
ing one other oﬃcially (Katsumata 2004: 237f.). This
encourages continuous consultation and leads to a com-
mon consensus. Subsequently, members do not have to
bow to decisions that are detrimental to their own na-
tional interests (Narine 2004: 437f.). In general ASEAN
strongly emphasizes the national sovereignty of member
states.
ASEAN is characterized by a lack of formal politi-
cal institutions (Katzenstein 1997: 29f.). The member
countries have been reluctant to transfer any decision-
making authority to supranational institutions (Mattli
1999: 171).
Additionally, there is another insuﬃciency within the
ASEAN decision making: declarations and papers of in-
tent are not binding. This situation can be explained
by the fact that each government in South East Asia is
still struggling to gain legitimacy within its own country.
Whereas great eﬀorts are made to solve these domestic
problems, there is little willingness to achieve greater
ﬁrmness in international relations (Narine 2004: 428).
2.3 ASEAN and disaster relief
On 26 June 1976, during an ASEAN meeting in Manila,
the “ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on Nat-
ural Disasters“ was signed. The declaration pointed out
that in case of a natural catastrophe there might be
a lack of ﬁnancial and human resources. Also, it was
agreed to provide a catastrophe-stricken country with
materials and medical supplies. Also, each country was
supposed to designate a national government agency
acting as an internal coordinating body. These agencies
should gather and exchange data pertaining to natural
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disasters. These government bodies were to implement
relief cooperation plans. Yet the declaration failed to
call for a central institution that could have organized
an ASEAN-wide relief eﬀort (ASEAN 2005a).
Five years before the Manila Declaration, in 1971,
disaster management experts had already formed
the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management
(AEGDM). Subsequently, these experts met every two
years. The 12th meeting was held in September 2002
in Vietnam. There, the experts agreed on restructuring
the AEGDM into an ASEAN Committee on Disaster
Management (ACDM). Also, they decided to intensify
their eﬀorts by meeting on an annual basis. Further-
more, the declaration stated that all decisions of the
ACDM should be endorsed by the ASEAN states. These
endorsements were to be obtained by meetings or by
written papers of intent facilitated by the secretariat in
Jakarta (ASEAN 2005c).
In August 1997, huge forest ﬁres on the island of Bor-
neo caused immense air pollution in wide parts of the
region. A dense cover of smog caused great distress
to the population of the region, especially in Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and even the Philip-
pines. In September, the so-called “haze“ had reached
an intolerable level. In fact, the haze aﬀected the re-
gion well into April 1998 (Hund 2002: 169). Similar air
pollution problems had occurred before in 1982, 1983,
1987, 1991 and 1994 (Cotton 1999: 331). In Septem-
ber 1995, ASEAN Senior Oﬃcials on the Environment
(ASEON) had already met in Bali. There, they agreed
on establishing a Haze Technical Task Force. Two years
later, with the haze of 1997, ASEAN was challenged
to act as a single entity, in order to cope with an un-
precedented regional problem. Thus in December 1997,
ASEAN set up a “Regional Haze Action Plan“. Of all
member countries, it was Indonesia which was reluctant
to participate. The country failed to adopt and im-
plement a national haze prevention plan. Government
oﬃcials in Jakarta took a nonchalant attitude towards
the haze, claiming it to be a domestic problem. The role
of the other ASEAN countries during the haze was also
questionable. They acted according to their policy of
non-interference, proclaiming the haze a regional prob-
lem after it was no longer possible to deny it. Instead of
cooperation, the haze caused diplomatic problems and
irritations between Indonesia and the countries aﬀected
by the crisis. Untypical for the conduct within ASEAN,
Singapore started waging a media campaign in order to
step up international pressure on Indonesia. The other
ASEAN members did not follow up on the Singaporean
line, refraining from putting pressure on Indonesia via
public platforms. The ASEAN member countries en-
gaged in diplomatic eﬀorts behind the scenes. This sort
of quiet diplomacy was supposed to prompt Indonesia to
put plans into action which should prevent future hazes.
The concessions by the Suharto government were not
very substantial. Instead, they were of tactical nature
and did not even prove to be permanent. The issue was
kept from public scrutiny, and it was only raised within
ASEAN meetings and consultations. Hence Indonesia
did not have to fear international embarrassment. Yet,
the haze resulted in discussions at the ASEAN level and
the implementation of the Regional Haze Action Plan.
After Indonesia failed to adopt it, ASEAN reacted by
negotiating with the United Nations, thus avoiding in-
ternal controversy on the matter (Hund 2002: 170, 177,
179). The weakness of diplomatic means within ASEAN
had become evident during the haze crisis (Cotton 1999:
348).
3 ASEAN: Cooperative disaster
relief after the tsunami?
Besides killing more than 200,000 people, the tsunami
also left millions of survivors without food or shelter.
Thousands were injured or fell sick because of sanitary
conditions. The coastal regions of four ASEAN mem-
bers were hit by the tidal wave: Indonesia, Malaysia,
Myanmar and Thailand. Aceh, a province at Indonesia’s
north-western tip, suﬀered the most fatalities: more
than 100,000 persons were killed and about 500,000 were
injured or left without shelter. The tsunami also struck
the northwestern coast of Malaysia, where the deaths of
at least 68 people were conﬁrmed (BBC 2005a). The
tsunami killed more than 5,300 people in Thailand: the
tidal wave destroyed mainly the touristic infrastructure
in the six western provinces. There is little information
about the impact of the tsunami on Myanmar. The
regime did ﬁle reports, claiming that the country to a
large extent had been spared by the ﬂood tide (SOAa,
1/2005, p. 7f.).
On January 6th 2005, during the tsunami aftermath
meeting, the ASEAN leaders issued a “declaration on
action to strengthen emergency relief, rehabilitation, re-
construction and prevention on the aftermath of the
earthquake and tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004“.
They expressed their condolences and solidarity. They
stated that the tsunami disaster calls for “global re-
sponse“ and appreciated the vast international help re-
ceived. Furthermore, they conﬁrmed the leading role
of the UN in the disaster relief. ASEAN indirectly ad-
mitted their deﬁcit in facing the tsunami disaster and
proclaimed their plans for improving disaster relief.
Further, ASEAN leaders stated that they will support
the aﬀected countries in rehabilitating and reconstruct-
ing. They welcomed the oﬀer of several creditor coun-
tries, which were willing to take the ﬁnancial pressures
oﬀ aﬀected countries by a “moratorium of payments“.
Also, ASEAN leaders wanted to persuade the private
sector to participate in the rehabilitation and recon-
struction. The ASEAN declaration requested the in-
ternational community and international organizations,
such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
the Islamic Development Bank, the European Invest-
ment Bank, to give aid to the process of reconstruction
and rehabilitation programs.
In order to prevent such a disaster in future, the
ASEAN leaders declared their will to extend their re-
gional mechanisms on disaster prevention and mitiga-
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tion. This was to be done by training military and
civilian personnel in disaster relief operations, as de-
termined in the “ASEAN Security Community Plan of
Action“. Further, they stated their aim to put the
“ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communica-
tion Network“ into action as provided for in the “ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community Component of the Vientiane
Action Programme“. Additionally, they stated that
they would establish a regional instrument for disaster
management and emergency response. Another impor-
tant point in the declaration was the need to estab-
lish a regional tsunami warning system on the Indian
Ocean and in the Southeast Asia region. They there-
fore aﬃrmed the need to develop and promote “national
and regional human and institutional capacity, transfer
of know-how, technology and scientiﬁc knowledge“ to-
gether with international cooperation and partnership
(ASEAN 2005d).
Apart from the ASEAN declarations and ASEAN as
the host of the Jakarta Summit, ASEAN as a forum of
regional cooperation was not mentioned in the media.
Also, there is not much information available on the
reactions of individual ASEAN states to the tsunami
disaster – neither in the media, nor on oﬃcial web sites
of the member countries.
The government of Myanmar refused help from other
countries. Prime Minister Soe Win stated that his coun-
try was able to cope with the catastrophe by itself and
that foreign aid should be directed to countries which
had been hit much harder (SOAa, 1/2005, p. 8).
But some ASEAN member countries reacted openly
to the calamity. Singapore dispatched 700 Air Force
and Civil Defense Force personnel for military and res-
cue operations to aid the relief eﬀorts (Kyodo, 31.12.05).
Singapore was one of the ﬁrst countries to assist Indone-
sia in managing the disaster relief. Singapore oﬀered to
raise its humanitarian assistance to US$ 3 million.
One day after the disaster, Malaysia dispatched
its “Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue
Team“ to Indonesia. It was the earliest team to arrive
at the scene (Bernama, 5.1.05). The Malaysian govern-
ment announced, that it had dispatched at least 300
soldiers to Aceh. Also, the Malaysian government an-
nounced its intentions to set up a relief center, in which
at least 10,000 survivors of the catastrophe were to be
sheltered (WSJ, 17.1.05). Additionally, at the request
of the Indonesian government, the Malaysians sent one
of their Royal Navy vessels including personnel to Aceh
(Bernama, 3.1.05).
The Malaysian government announced its plan to im-
plement an oﬃcial tsunami warning system by the end of
this year. Brunei has oﬀered to take part in this project,
which is said to cost an estimated US$ 5 million (BBC
2005a).
4 Disaster relief from non-ASEAN
Countries
In total, almost US$ 4 billion have been pledged by
the international community.1 Chart 1 only lists non-
ASEAN states, as there is no information available con-
cerning whether or not ASEAN member countries of-
fered donations. The exception is Singapore, which had
oﬀered US$ 3 million.
Chart 1: Government donations for tsunami dis-
aster relief
Country Donations in million US$
Australia 77
Netherlands 34
Canada 343
North Korea 0.15
China 83
Norway 183
Denmark 75
Qatar 25
France 66
Russia 10
Germany 674
South Korea 50
Great Britain 96
Spain 68
India 600
Sweden 80
Italy 95
United States 350
Japan 500
Total 3,409.15
Source: BBC 2005b.
Together with UN agencies and several non-govern-
mental aid organisations, troops from the US, Australia,
Germany and other nations helped assist the relief ef-
fort by supplying supporting measures (WSJ, 17.1.05).
A 25-member Chinese search and rescue team arrived
ﬁve days after the disaster occurred in Banda Aceh, the
capital of Aceh. The Chinese also sent medical staﬀ to
Thailand and Sri Lanka in order to help tsunami victims
(Xinhua, 5.1.05). Japan sent 120 civilian emergency
workers to the tsunami-hit countries. Great Britain sent
two Royal Air Force planes in order to deliver aid to the
aﬀected countries. The government of Denmark dis-
patched a ﬁeld hospital, transport vehicles and a ship
to aid the UN disaster relief. Furthermore 350 military
staﬀ, military helicopters, troop transport ships and a
military health support team as well as a water puriﬁ-
cation plant were sent to Indonesia. Germany sent a
mobile hospital to Aceh and a military ship with two
helicopters and aid supplies. India’s military engaged in
1Even though the promised donations were generous, the majority of the 38 countries who had promised ﬁnancial aid had not paid
in February. On the other hand, countries who had not pledged any money did contribute later on, e.g. Saudi Arabia gave US$ 100
million in cash. See Tempo Interaktif, 31.1.05.
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its largest ever relief operation by sending about 16,000
troops, 32 navy ships, 41 aircraft and medical teams
with relief supplies to Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Mal-
dives. Pakistan send 500 military personnel to Indonesia
and Sri Lanka (BBC 2005b).
The US Department of Foreign Aﬀairs initiated a
structure that should coordinate international cooper-
ation. By doing so, a more eﬀective relief eﬀort was
to be implemented. The coordination was to be led by
Washington and centered around a core group of coun-
tries, including Japan, Australia and India. This plan
did not last very long, since the core group was dissolved
after one week. After that, the United States assumed
leadership in managing the catastrophe (Japan Times,
7.1.05).
On 6 January 2005, Indonesia hosted a summit to dis-
cuss the tsunami disaster. Originally, it was proposed
to bring together not only the ASEAN leaders, but also
the leaders and representatives of Australia, the EU,
New Zealand, India, Sri Lanka, the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank. In total, the leaders of
26 countries and groups attended (Xinhua, 6.1.05).
In his opening speech at the summit, President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono on behalf of ASEAN asked the
United Nations to form a special body for an eﬀective
organizing of aid to the countries struck by the tsunami.
He also asked the UN to play a leading role in managing
relief eﬀorts in these countries.
At the Jakarta Summit, China announced that it
would hold a seminar with ASEAN to discuss a tsunami
warning system in the Indian Ocean. This seminar took
place on 25-26 January 2005 in Beijing (Xinhua, 6.1.05).
5 ASEAN and the tsunami: prob-
lems and challenges
ASEAN as the regional institution in the tsunami-hit-
area was hardly mentioned in the media. Instead, the
US, the UN and the Asian powers China and Japan
were recognized as the major players in the relief ef-
forts. The reports mainly focused on ASEAN’s con-
tribution in hosting the tsunami aftermath conference.
The fact that ASEAN failed to cooperate on disaster
relief, mainly contributed to its minor role in public at-
tention.
ASEAN’s reaction to the tsunami catastrophe was
limited to agreement on the “declaration on action to
strengthen emergency relief, rehabilitation, reconstruc-
tion and prevention on the aftermath of the earthquake
and tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004“ (ASEAN
2005d). In this declaration, ASEAN announced steps
which should be implemented urgently in order to min-
imize the post-calamity damage. This declaration was
similar to other papers of intent, which had been put for-
ward after previous states of emergency, such as the haze
catastrophe of 1997. The declaration concerning the
tsunami makes it clear that ASEAN seems to acknow-
ledge its deﬁcits in coping with disaster relief, especially
when ASEAN speaks of having to “strengthen coordi-
nation and cooperation“. The declaration shows some
powerlessness on part of ASEAN, as it has many insti-
tutions but no real central organization, which would
have been important for organizing the cooperation of
the relief eﬀorts. Thus the principle problems of cooper-
ation on the ASEAN level became evident through the
tsunami situation.
Interestingly enough, the declaration does not specify,
whether ASEAN should assume a leading role in imme-
diate disaster relief or reconstruction eﬀorts. Further,
ASEAN emphasises the need for international aid and
the important role of the UN. This chain of reasoning
on part of ASEAN shows its inability to cope with a sce-
nario such as after the tsunami. The declaration thus
reveals that ASEAN, even after 30 years of existence,
has not managed to build up a structure enough to pro-
vide a pivoting point for decision-making and immediate
response eﬀorts among the member countries.
This adherence to sovereignty leads ASEAN into a
system of checks and balances, which in turn lessens the
eﬀectiveness of any cooperative project (Fawcett 2004:
444). Another problem of ASEAN is the inability to dis-
cuss problems on a public platform. Hence, structural
faults are not recognised as such. Rather than admit-
ting to weaknesses within the system, ASEAN states are
committed to the principle of a strong state, which does
not allow for trying diﬀerent solutions (Narine 2004:
424ﬀ.).
When Southeast Asian national leaders came together
to join into ASEAN, they saw the instability of their
own political systems. Thus, ASEAN is the product
of a collective aim to overcome fragility on a domestic
and regional level. Taking this into account, it is un-
clear how ASEAN countries will try to achieve a more
comprehensive way of cooperating, which would mean
giving up some sovereignty (Yamakage 2004: 36ﬀ.).
Only one day after the tsunami had struck, the
Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono an-
nounced that his government would open up the Aceh
region to foreign relief teams. This, despite the fact,
that the region was subject to civil war and up to this
time was oﬀ-limits for all foreigners. Soldiers from the
US and Singapore did arrive in the disaster area. Yet
vice-president Jusuf Kalle announced that they were
only welcome for a limit of three months. The rea-
son for this was the fear of losing control over the civil
war region, which in turn could lead to international
interference in the conﬂict. Indonesia has had such an
experience with East Timor in 1999 and was therefore
extremely wary of the situation (SOAa, 1/2005, p. 5).
This is one example of ASEAN countries being reluc-
tant to accept help from foreign countries, even though
the oﬀers from abroad were very generous.
The ASEAN leaders tend to proclaim that the soli-
darity within the association is unassailable (Yamakage
2004: 35). Yet new problems arise with the question
of how to implement a tsunami early warning system
in the region. Unquestionably, ASEAN should be the
key player in this matter. At a meeting on regional co-
operation at the end of January, the Chinese Foreign
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Minister Li Zhaoxing said that China supports the role
of ASEAN in this matter (The Nation online, 29.1.05).
Following the tsunami, an early warning system for
the whole Indian Ocean region was the subject of sev-
eral international conferences. So far, there has been no
concensus on where it shall be based. Instead, the UN
was asked to work out an interim decentralised network
(BBC 2005a). Cooperation and coordination are impor-
tant for an eﬀective warning system. Nevertheless, there
have been disputes among ASEAN members about the
location of the warning system (Economist, 5.2.05). In-
donesia, India and Thailand all insisted on being the
best country to host the Asian Disaster Preparedness
Center (ADPC) (The Nation online, 29.1.05).
When ASEAN was founded, it was supposed to
demonstrate closeness to the outside, but due to lack
of regional identity and mistrust, there is competition
within ASEAN states, even in such an important mat-
ter as the location of a tsunami early warning system.
The fact that ASEAN is troubled by so many internal
divisions indicates its structural weakness.
In its declaration of January 6th 2005, ASEAN rec-
ognized the importance of the UN in the disaster re-
lief eﬀort and called for international assistance for the
aﬀected countries. The tsunami-hit countries also wel-
comed the global disaster relief assistance. The diﬀer-
ence between the regional institution of ASEAN and the
global institution of the UN exists due to the interests of
their member countries. UN members have no interest
in engaging in disputes over disaster relief eﬀorts. Also,
they do not have conﬂicting interests over security issues
and do not have to worry over diplomatic consequences
arising from actions such as sending troops. Due to the
lack of control of ASEAN member states over global in-
stitutions such as the UN, the World Bank, the IMF,
etc., they seek control over their own association and
refuse to let decisions come from the outside (Narine
2004: 424).
As shown in Chart 1, the larger part of ﬁnancial aid
came from overseas governments. This is due to the fact
that ASEAN member states were either aﬀected by the
catastrophe or did not have suﬃcient funds. ASEAN
practically did not have any means of supplying ﬁnan-
cial resources for the disaster relief eﬀorts. We should
not forget that the economic growth rates as well as the
present level of economic development of Asian coun-
tries diﬀer widely (Fischer 2003: 12f.). Thus, the lack
of resources could be one reason why ASEAN is not able
to cope with such catastrophes on its own.
The tsunami disaster made evident the insuﬃcient
structure of ASEAN and its inability to deal with dis-
aster relief. This calamity might enhance the pressure
for reform. Other crises also lead to a call for reforms.
But the problem is that for a more eﬀective cooperation
there must be cooperation across national boundaries.
In 2000, when Thailand’s Foreign Minister Surin Pit-
suwan suggested intensifying the cooperation between
ASEAN countries and presented a proposal, especially
Myanmar and Vietnam took contrary positions and de-
clared their unwillingness to lose their sovereignty. They
still insisted on the ASEAN principle of non-interference
(taz, 25.7.00). This insistence on the principles of the
ASEAN-way results in the ASEAN dilemma, namely
the inability of the ASEAN member countries to solve
their problems by their own eﬀorts.
The various declarations of ASEAN summon up a vi-
sionary plan of action. Yet, this diﬀers widely from real-
ity, expressing itself in the insuﬃcient intergovernmental
plights of cooperation. This diﬀerence cannot be over-
come by the principles of the “ASEAN way“.
6 Conclusion
ASEAN is often cited in essays as “the most notable ex-
ample of regional grouping in Asia“ (Mattli 1999: 163).
Yet, after the tsunami disaster, ASEAN was hardly ever
mentioned in media reports on immediate relief eﬀorts.
This is part of a pattern exempliﬁed by former failures
of ASEAN to engage in disaster relief, such as during
the haze catastrophes of 1967 and 1998 (Cotton 1999:
331).
Coordination of mutual interests among the six di-
verse states is still diﬃcult. One reason is, that the
ASEAN member countries are still trying to diﬀerent
degrees to establish their political legitimacy. In ad-
dition, they are committed to the ideal of sovereignty
even though this may often be impossible to attain (Nar-
ine 2004: 428). Thus the importance of legitimacy and
sovereignty to the ASEAN member countries remains
an obstacle for eﬀective coordination.
ASEAN must realize that there is not only the possi-
bility of major natural disasters in South East Asia, but
also the threat of terrorism (Suebsman 2004: 25f.). It is
therefore important for ASEAN to strengthen its coop-
eration and overcome the ASEAN dilemma. Whether
or not ASEAN is willing to change its structure and its
policy in order to manage future challenges remains to
be seen.
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